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ABSTRACT 
Developing microstates are bountiful on the world political map today. Yet 
the concept of smallness, apart from being relativistic, conjures up a sense of 
deviation, indicative of a subtle discrimination which implicitly takes large to 
be normal and preferable. Based on an extensive yet selective literature 
review, this article suggests that the orthodox development paradigm, in both 
its liberal and radical traditions, has borne little relevance to small developing 
states, either in theory or in practice. On looking more closely at the survival 
strategies of developing micro-economies, it is proposed that a different con- 
ceptualization of ‘development’ is warranted; one which, for all its negative 
connotations, is bmth plausible and consistent with the peculiar practices of 
microstates. 
THE THEME 
It was a combination of imperial retrenchment and grass roots agita- 
tion, fed by the appeals to rights of self-determination and national 
liberation which, in the aftermath of the Second World War, led to 
a profusion of independent states. In 1952 there were around eighty 
politically independent states; now, just forty years later, that figure 
has more than doubled. Of these, forty are small or micro states, 
each with a resident population of less than one million.’ There 
also remain around forty-two other, still dependent, small terri- 
tories which may be considered as potential microstates and which 
exercise varying degrees of self-government.* Smallness is of 
course a relative term, and there are a host of different ways in 
which smallness may be, and has been, defined.’ We are, however, 
spared most of the confusion by the remarkable combination of 
Development and Change (SAGE, London, Newbury Park and New Delhi), Vol. 24 
(1993), 29-51. 
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different parameters of smallness. While smallness of population, 
of natural resources and of territorial size are the dominant com- 
peting variables, the saving grace is that most microstates are small 
on all these counts (Erb and Schiavo-Campo, 1969: 187). 
Developing microstates may be bountiful on the contemporary 
political map. Nevertheless, the concept of smallness, apart from 
being a relativistic one, also conjures up a sense of anomaly. This 
is indicative of a subtle discrimination which implicitly assumes that 
large is normal and preferable whereas small - if considered at 
all - is at best petty and lilliputian. This article explores how, in the 
absence of an emergent and inductive microstate theorization, 
mainstream development theory and strategy have borne little 
relevance to small developing states and continue to be perplexed by 
them. On closer examination of the survival strategies of developing 
micro-economies, it is suggested that a different, alternative para- 
digm of ‘development’ is warranted, one which is both plausible and 
consistent with the peculiar predicament of microstates. 
PENETRATED SOCIETIES 
In spite of various prognostications to the contrary (for example 
Wood, 1967:96), there is a good deal of evidence from recent 
history to suggest that, when compared to larger developing states, 
very small countries have achieved and maintained a significantly 
better track record: they have a higher GNP per capita (Jalan, 
1982: 1; Lloyd and Sundrum, 1982: 20; UNCTAD Secretariat, 1985: 
129); a higher school enrolment ratio (Bray and Fergus, 1986: 100; 
Dommen, 1980: 942); lower mortality rates (Dommen, 1980: 937); 
and they receive more development assistance per capita, and on less 
harsh terms, than larger countries (Bray, 1992: 53; de Vries, 1975; 
Knapman, 1986: 140,147; Singleton, 1990: 6; UNCTAD Secre- 
tariat, 1985: 143-4). This goes against the fundamental expectations 
of both liberal and radical perspectives on development and under- 
development. Indeed, it may seem astonishing that microstates did 
not throw these models overboard long ago in the stark realization 
of their inapplicability to microstates’ different, or perhaps we 
should say peculiar, condition. Yet, when we consider the historical 
and colonial heritage of the world‘s small states, then it becomes 
much less surprising that they cling so tenaciously to models derived 
from the metropole. 
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Firstly, within the global process of decolonization, there has 
been a certain languidity about the way in which most microstates 
sought to obtain independent status. Of the territories which have 
achieved political sovereignty, microstates have been among the 
very last (Doumenge, ,1989: 51). Few actually struggled for 
independence; for many, the process was undramatic, somewhat 
haphazard or even sudden. Micro-territory domestic political forces 
have at times been more enthusiastically engaged in forestalling 
independence than in clamouring for it,4 the initiative behind such 
‘upside down decolonization’ being due more to the readiness of the 
colonizing powers to let their erstwhile colonies go (Hoefte and 
Oostindie, 1991 : 93). Even today, many small dependent territories, 
the outposts of empires, still cling tenaciously and proudly to their 
colonial status (Winchester, 1985). For them, cashing in the 
independence cheque is not only an extravagant proposition but an 
impoverishing one as well.’ 
Secondly, it is to the international dynamics of colonization and 
imperialism that microstates owe their original entrance into 
civilization. Most small territories were uninhabited; in others 
indigenous populations were decimated or wiped out soon after the 
first contacts with European culture, falling victim to superior use 
of force, merciless physical exploitation or new, and therefore 
lethal, contagious diseases passed on (unwittingly?) by the Euro- 
pean invaders (Moorehead, 1966: 88; Wolf, 1982: 133-5). The net 
result is that colonizers started off with a tabula ram. Many 
microstates have therefore not been colonized but created by 
penetration from outside, a penetration often involving (relatively) 
massive influxes of immigrant labour (Houbert, 1980: 146). They 
conform to Naipaul’s ‘manufactured societies, labour camps, crea- 
tions of empire’ (Naipaul, 1972: 254). They may be states, and take 
pains to proclaim that they are such; but many are still searching 
painfully for a sense of authentic nationhood.6 If they can speak at 
all of a local culture, it is generally a non-indigenous creole variety, 
itself a by-product of colonialism. Even radical reactions to 
imperialism have not managed to escape the strictures of inverted 
imagery.’ 
Thirdly, microstates have proved to be extremely prone to a wide 
repertoire of external interventions. Economically, they suffer from 
the ‘concentration phenomenon’ (Lloyd and Sundrum, 1982: 27) - 
a dependence on a very narrow range of tropical agricultural 
products (typically sugar, bananas, copra, pineapples), light 
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manufacturing (textiles, screwdriver industries) or services 
(tourism, tax havens, banking, data processing) with little or no 
influence on the terms of trade. The weakness of this arrangement 
is its vulnerability to potentially erratic market fluctuations which 
microstates cannot predict or preempt.* With a limited range of 
resources available, microstates will tend to be heavily dependent on 
international trade, not only for the provision of luxury consumer 
goods and raw materials for processing but also for a high propor- 
tion of essential foodstuffs. Given also that microstates can 
generally command limited domestic investment, overseas market 
share, engineering know-how, design acumen and marketing skills 
to operate export-oriented production successfully, the outcome is 
typically a reliance on a few, foreign owned enterprises, operating 
on highly privileged terms. The linchpin of the local economy 
becomes an enclave beyond domestic control. Financially, a large 
number of microstates receive considerable largesse from beyond 
their shores. These include remittances from emigrants as well as 
official visible and invisible aid. These inflows constitute a regular, 
vital share to the national balance of payments (Doumenge, 
1985: 100; Sutton, 1987: 20-1). Militarily, microstates have obvious 
limitations and while they do not usually behave in ways which 
alienate or anger more powerful neighbours, a pretext is seldom 
lacking if the stronger party deems it fit to invade - witness the 
cases of Cyprus (1974), the Falklands/Malvinas (1982). Grenada 
(1983) and Kuwait (1990) in recent years, not to mention various 
other unsuccessful attempts (Espindola, 1987). Ecologically, most 
microstates are prone to natural disasters such as cyclones, 
epidemics and droughts. While larger countries can often take such 
setbacks in their stride, microstates are likely to suffer shattering 
and long-lasting consequences (Dolman, 1985: 42; Dommen, 
1980: 936; Doumenge, 1985: 86; Wood, 1967: 32). In all of this, the 
common theme of openness with which microstates are allegedly 
plagued stands out clearly. Indeed, there are indications that such 
a dependence on externalities spills over into cultural and psycho- 
logical dependence. Smallness appears to increase the likelihood, 
pervasiveness and legitimacy of penetration. 
Penetrated socia1 systems are characterized by a perceived 
shortage of capabilities and resources, which provides legitimacy for 
the participation of ‘imports’. Such a receptor orientation is typical 
of most developing post-colonial states. Smallness may also be 
understood to hasten and improve the assimilation of citizens, when 
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and if they are impregnated by colonialism’s ‘civilizing mission’. The 
effects are likely to be spread over the whole population, helped by 
the weighty, often intimate, presence of European establishments 
(Green, 1984: 114; Shaw, 1982: 106). There is also virtually no 
physical or cultural hinterland in which to retreat (Hintjens, 
1991: 38). 
Penetration has indeed been so complete and thorough that 
microstates have hardly ever looked at themselves critically in terms 
which are not of foreign, typically western, provenance. They may 
thus have failed to come up with proper answers to their problems 
because they have failed to raise the proper questions. What is miss- 
ing is a praxis informed by local experiences and guided by locally 
determined objectives; a formal intellectual tradition which is 
authentically native to their habitat (Girvan and Jefferson, 1971: 1; 
McIntyre, 1971: 165). Even following the achievement of political 
independence, the absence of such an inductive and reflexive stance 
remains practically guaranteed, with the microstates’ intelligentsia 
either opting to join the brain and skill drain for a better future 
elsewhere or else socialized into western constructs by exposure 
to western pedagogy. They have thus been among the most 
enthusiastic and uncritical in embracing and championing the doc- 
trines and associated methods and policies devised by others. This 
betrays a lack of sensitivity to arguably different social experiences 
in different geographical milieux. 
Microstate decision-makers appear generally oblivious - or 
even outrightly proud - of the fact that their perceptions of their 
own interests, problems and prospects are significantly shaped and 
determined by externally constructed, western-biased theories and 
models of what should be. As a result, specific concern for the 
microstate condition has been neglected. In part, this is explained by 
the marginality of microstates, and in part by the fact that, in many 
aspects of theoretical and applied social science, it is generally and 
implicitly assumed that what applies for large states can be equally 
valid, in proportion, to small ones. It is easy to be taken in by grand, 
cosmic explanations. Almost nothing original and innovative is evi- 
dent - in nearly every case, the microstate is offered tried and 
tested theories and procedures, with the accompanying prescrip- 
tions. Adaptations to these hallowed canons have generally been 
limited to proportional scaling: scaling down the doctrines to 
fit the circumstances of microstates, or somehow scaling up the 
microstates to suit the doctrines by, for instance, the use of regional 
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institutions and region-based specializations (Murray, 198 1 : 247). 
Unaware of any sense of fallacy, microstate policy-makers and 
academics continue to resort to these concepts and painstakingly try 
to employ them in normative, analytic or even predictive endeavour. 
If the practice fails to match the theory, then it is the practice which 
is somehow wrong, and which is labelled as anomalous and 
pathol~gical.~ This phenomenon is clearly evident in the realm of 
development theory and strategy. 
SMALL SIZE: AN INHERENT PROBLEM? 
The cardinal recommendation of the orthodox liberal theory of 
development is the Ricardian one of specialization - the securing 
and defence of international market niches, reaping wealth from 
trade based on comparative advantage and economies of scale. It 
therefore comes as no surprise that the microstates appearing in 
quick succession on the world political map were discounted as 
inherently problematic; through the neo-classical lens their small 
size was seen as a structural inhibitor to the prerequisites of the 
development path. 
The taxonomy of identified constraints is impressively insur- 
mountable. On the supply side, total land area on most micro- 
states is scarce, and land with specific exploitable properties even 
more so. The labour force is likely to have a narrow spread of 
specialization, which could result in frequent and unpredictable 
shortages of specific skills. Slight demographic imbalances may 
lead to sudden, critical shortfalls or surpluses in labour market 
segments, not easily resolved because of the logistic difficulties 
involved in recruiting or shedding labour across national frontiers. 
Capital is likely to be locally scarce and must therefore be sought 
from overseas. Entrepreneurship is also perceived as lacking, 
the locals being dismissed as deficient in organizational skills, 
technical know-how and risk orientation. On the demand'side, the 
limited domestic market renders almost all productive activities 
(subsistence agriculture and traditional cottage industry being 
the exceptions) quite uneconomical let alone profitable, unless a 
substantial export outlet is developed. At the same time exports 
are, at best, restricted to a few commodities and the micro- 
state, again because of its size, lacks the capacity to influence the 
terms of international trade in any economic way: its produce is 
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internationally insignificant in terms both of volume and of finan- 
cial or strategic value." 
Microstates, it seems, have all the odds stacked against them. 
They fail to meet the credentials of the closed-economy basis of 
standard development models on every count. Open-economy 
elements such as trade, capital flows, migration and exposure to 
world prices are not an annexe but rather constitute the main 
economic flows of such small states. It becomes impossible not to 
consider them as problems (Bray, 1987). 
The Dependency School introduced a structuralist and trans- 
national dimension to the debate on the causes and persistence of 
underdevelopment: it was not enough to blame microstate under- 
development on smallness per se but on the instruments which 
controlled the small economy. Microstate economies could be 
developed, but the avenues to do so were most elusive. While radical 
underdevelopment theory opened up theoretical possibilities for 
microstates, the associated strategy prescriptions were, regrettably, 
often rhetorical. The policy recommendations of dependency 
theory were fuelled by the long-term objective of self-sustained 
growth, but the means of achieving this appeared physically 
beyond all but the larger countries. Self-reliance and self-sustained 
growth may have an emotive, nationalistic ring, and they may 
travel a long way when espoused by a charismatic leadership; but 
history has shown that these pronouncements soon become 
politically indefensible, economically catastrophic and culturally 
impossible to sustain. Microstate leaders, perhaps most of all, 
would find it hard to sell the idea of economic self-reliance to 
their citizens even for a short spell, accustomed as they are to 
the reception of alien imports. These may be bicycle societies, but 
they have cadillac tastes." 
Microstates in search of policy guidelines thus find themselves 
engulfed in a functionalist and tautological world order which 
even large states cannot influence. The possibility for development 
has been neatly 'defined away' (Best, 1971: 129). Socialist self- 
reliance (for example Thomas, 1974) often reads like an exten- 
sion of wish-fulfilment and does not appear so attractive per se. 
The spectre of marginalization and of destabilization is a far 
less palatable one to bear than that of integrated economic 
dependence. 
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Regionalization as a Non-Event 
By proclaiming the theoretical ot practical impossibility of 
nationally based development (in spite of its implicit desirability), 
the competing mainstream development paradigms share the recom- 
mendation that microstates should strive for supra-national, 
regional integration. This is suggested either in order to achieve the 
scale necessary for a viable export-oriented development strategy or 
else for the sake of collective self-reliance, a division of labour 
among socialist countries preferable to national autarchy. There are 
quite solid arguments in favour of regional integration as a strategy 
for alleviating the burdens imposed by smallness: the wider markets 
which regionalism creates - not only in terms of goods and services 
but also in less orthodox commodities such as administrative 
facilities, higher education, diplomatic efforts, consultancy, finance 
and military capability - offer the chance of capturing otherwise 
most elusive economies of scale (Abbott, 1975: 108-9; Bray, 
1990: 275-7; Selwyn, 1975: 20-3). 
Yet the experience of microstate regional integration systems 
shows that they have fallen victim to an uneven distribution of costs 
and benefits, a slow and ponderous decision-making machinery and 
policy decisions taken on the basis of national (rather than interna- 
tional) self-interest (Abbott, 1975: 110; Wallace, 1977; Wiltshire, 
1976). It would also seem that microstates judge there to be wider 
(and more profitable?) possibilities for action by being an 
autonomous policy-making unit, which are perceived to outweigh 
the more secure but lower profile and more constraining effects of 
regional collusion (Clarke, 1987: 84; Thorndike, 1987: 102). 
A Non-Strategy of Opportunist Pragmatism 
It would seem closer to the truth to argue that, for most microstates, 
it is not a question of which development strategy to choose: a free 
choice has never really existed. It is rather a case of pursuing any 
available strategy consistently and yet being prepared to ditch it 
when the situation so demands. Development policy is basically 
a balancing act (Seers, 1983). To succeed in development is to 
perceive and exploit the possibilities and mitigate the obstacles as 
these emerge, in compliance with the basic formulations of what 
is understood by development in particular contexts (Selwyn, 
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1975:20). The policy, to be relevant, must remain flexible and 
responsive to concrete strategies applied to what are understood to 
be constantly and unpredictably changing conditions. ‘Economic 
development is a problem of management - of timing, sequencing 
and manipulating in an unending effort to perceive or create, and 
in any case, to exploit a multiplicity of little openings and oppor- 
tunities’ (Best, 1971: 30). Contrast this reality of microstates’ con- 
tingent and opportunist pragmatism (Moen, 1982: 345) with the 
western idea of development as organic, directional, cumulative, 
irreversible and purposive (Hettne, 1990: 80). 
The room for manoeuvre is arguably most limited for micro- 
states: any manoeuvring they engage in must be carried out with skill 
to clinch a successful outcome. For microstates do have choices to 
make; they embrace a set of options which is certainly wider than 
that of complete acquiescence to international dynamics. Certain 
elements in dependency may be structural, but others are contingent 
on actors’ policies and decisions. If there is such room for 
manoeuvre it is in the interest of all states, but of microstates most 
crucially, to recognize it and exploit it to the full. 
For many microstates, smallness - and the characteristics of 
insularity and remoteness which usually accompany it - need not 
represent a trinity of despair but rather an opportunity. Insularity 
has automatic defensive and locational advantages which a number 
of small states have utilized to develop as centres at which ‘merchan- 
dise’ can be stored and/or trans-shipped. Historically, this has 
included prisoners and slaves; today it includes fish, chemicals, fuel 
and cargo (Dommen, 1981). Remoteness carries the possibilities of 
military and strategic uses as well as the advantages of crop gene 
pool isolation (Cohen, 1983: 16-18; Wace, 1980); perceptions of 
strategic location and global insecurity frequently result in the 
installation of military or telecommunications bases. These advan- 
tages in themselves starkly highlight the problems of microstate 
powerlessness which these small states may well prefer to exploit 
rather than avoid. 
THE ECONOMICS OF PRODUCTIVE DIPLOMACY 
Given that their political status and national sovereignty inevitably 
exceed their economic influence, it is likely that microstates will seek 
to use this balance to their net advantage, opting for non-market 
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solutions to their problems (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1985: 68). 
The history of economics in the real world is, after all, none other 
than a continual attempt to distort and usurp the free market to 
one’s perceived advantage. Microstates are unlikely to harbour 
pretensions as to the influence commanded by their small product 
range, value or volume in the international economy. They are quite 
aware that, behind the rhetoric of perfect competition and free 
trade, those who control access to technology, markets, material 
resources and finance have a predetermined lead. Microstates would 
therefore be guaranteed losers if they were to abide by the official 
rules of the game. They cannot afford to jeopardize their survival 
by putting all their eggs into one basket - the international eco- 
nomy - over which they have so little control. Here, microstates 
find another unexpected advantage in their smallness: the impor- 
tance of being unimportant - the power of being powerless - 
enables them to clinch favourable deals which concede special 
advantages. This helps them avoid playing the inevitable role of 
price-takers. Because they comprise only a minuscule proportion 
of total transactions in the international system, microstates 
may be successful in these transactions and avoid retaliation, even 
if they infringe upon the system’s rules (Demas, 196291; Reid, 
1974: 30). It is often only by being diplomatic, political actors that 
they can get their prices right (Brookfield, 1987: 56-7; Taylor, 
The evidence of recent history suggests that microstates, even 
those without tradable natural resources, have fared well. There are, 
admittedly, some exceptions to this trend, but these are microstates 
whose dominant cultures are Indian and/or African, whose main 
religion is non-Christian, and where the majority of the population 
can speak no European languages. The anomalies may thus confirm 
the general rule; in other words, these countries have not been 
penetrated enough - they have not been sufficiently groomed as 
products of a European maritime culture, or have otherwise 
forfeited this legacy in search of a different vision which failed to 
materialize (Caldwell et al., 1980: 954). The few particularly poor 
microstates are actually those which have failed to establish (or 
have abrogated) sufficiently intimate relations with a prosperous 
protector.” 
1987: 1-3). 
The Pseudo-Development Strategies of Microstates 39 
A Shameless Survival Strategy . . . 
Being small, disaster prone, environmentally precarious and facing 
logistic and transport constraints, many microstates do not appear 
keen to sever the umbilical cord with the external world. Once 
resigned to ‘dependent development’, microstates may well establish 
a life-line to a richer country (Hoetjes, 1992: 142-3; Hoogendonk, 
1989: 104; Sutton, 1987: 20-1). Today, most appear to believe that 
their best chance lies in even better (though dependent) integration 
within world capitalism. Surprisingly, such dependence seems to 
allow these peripheries of the periphery the miraculous possibility of 
turning unequal exchange topsy-turvy - thriving on a net transfer 
of value from the core (Connell, 1991:96; McKee and Tisdell, 
1990: 170). They may have decolonized, but they have no intention 
of disengaging (Houbert, 1986: 145). 
Such an evaluation of a continuing experience falls far short of 
any of the espoused theories of development. It is rather a crude 
realization of a survival strategy which shamelessly seeks to maxi- 
mize consumption (rather than production) levels, preferably on a 
par with idealized western standards. Small size and all it brings with 
it make any other ‘development strategy’ unsustainable: but then, 
the microstate can tap resources elsewhere to assuage its needs, rely- 
ing on the receipt of aid in various guises and exporting the most 
extraordinary of commodities and services to earn a living. The 
commodities include postage stamps, exotic seashells, petty handi- 
crafts, sun, sea, sand (and sex?) as well as human resources such as 
migrant workers; the services include natural beauty, tourist- 
appeasing plastic cultures, fishing and mining rights, flags of conve- 
nience and suitable locations for drugs trans-shipment and money 
laundering. 
. . . with a Different Notion of Viability 
In 1975, Selwyn boldly proposed that small countries need not be 
assumed to be problems - there were both economies and dis- 
economies of scale. As late as 1980, it also became possible to 
identify some advantages of spatial isolation and remoteness. These 
advances were significant examples of paradigmatic iconoclasti- 
cism: increasingly, the academic and policy world was coming to 
terms with the irrefutable fact that microstates exist and obstinately 
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show no signs of withering away. This could only imply that they 
were viable in their own peculiar manner: sum ergo sum (Selwyn, 
1975: 12). Viability can mean simply survivability or livability, and 
thus need not imply anything close to self-reliant development, with 
an economy generating internally the productive requirements for 
expanded reproduction through time (Abbott, 1975: 107-8). 
Many microstates today survive and even thrive on a ‘rentier 
status’ in the world economy. Rents are revenues which are cut off 
from any directly productive activity on the part of the recipient 
(Bertram and Watters, 1985: 500): they include aid, remittances 
from abroad, dividends on foreign securities, licences, stamp duties, 
customs receipts, land or fishing taxes, leases, loans and payments 
for the provision of various services - tourism, banking, tax 
havens, finance, military bases, casinos, yacht berths, space track- 
ing facilities, trans-shipment, flags of convenience, bunkering, 
waste dumping sites, philately and other collectors’ items - which 
are collectively known as invisible receipts (Dommen, 1981; 
Legarda, 1984: 43). Ricardo’s aversion to rentiers and Marx’s 
predilection for productive over unproductive labour may both be 
responsible for the fact that such a survival strategy (‘from sub- 
sistence to subsidy’: Connell, 1992) is looked on as anathema. It is 
frowned upon as parasitic, fragile and non-entrepreneurial; it does 
not contribute to any basis for local accumulation (Dolman, 
1985: 54; Selwyn, 1975: 18; UNCTAD Secretariat, 1985: 138). Even 
where microstates are the beneficiaries of expanded territorial 
resources, their rentier orientation persists. The new Law of the Sea, 
with its provision for a 320 km exclusive economic zone implies an 
astronomical increase in coastal zone jurisdiction, especially for 
dispersed archipelagic microstates. Yet this has not led to self- 
reliant, productive activity by microstates but to a leasing out of 
extractive rights, and even of their enforcement, to distant and 
richer nations (Connell, 1988; McKee and Tisdell, 1990: Ch. 11; 
Waugh, 1987). 
A PARADIGMATIC DIVIDE? 
In looking at the experiences of various developing microstates 
through the lens of mainstream vision, the temptation is to consign 
them to exceptionality as ‘special cases’ (Kaplinsky, 1983: 195) or 
‘genuine puzzles’ (Rosenau, 1983: 4). As traditional analysis bears 
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little relevance to these territories in theory, its analysts continue to 
be confounded by them in practice (Bryan, 1983: 237). 
For many years, development theory has struggled primarily with 
the problem of explaining why, in countries which are intrinsically 
richly endowed with resources and possibilities and which contain 
all the necessary economies of scale, economic development failed 
to occur while poverty and misery actually increased. In the mean- 
time, out of sight and out of mind, most of the world’s smallest 
territories, although intrinsically poor, managed to establish and 
cling to a standard of living which is above what could realistically 
be obtained on the basis of local production and which is in some 
cases significantly higher than that of much larger neighbours. The 
Protestant Ethic, the notion of viability impIying ‘standing on your 
own feet and earning your keep’ (Schumacher, 1973: 65), continues 
to exert a paradigmatic stranglehold on theorization. It is difficult, 
even in the face of incontrovertible evidence, to throw such funda- 
mental parameters overboard, and to boldly seek out an alternative 
hypothesis with superior explanatory potential. 
The power of such a value orientation is demonstrated by the wide 
range of popular cultural expressions which pay tribute to its pro- 
verbial, and assumed to be globally relevant, ‘wisdom’. French 
writer Jean de La Fontaine (1621-95) epitomizes the moral in the 
popular fable of the cricket and the ant. All through the summer, 
the story goes, the industrious ant goes about collecting food to 
store for the winter months, while the cricket leads a carefree life, 
even laughing at the ant who is working hard. But when the cold 
season approaches, the hungry cricket is forced to knock on the ant’s 
door and to beg for charity. In the fable, the ant solemnly turns the 
cricket away and the latter pays for his irresponsibility with death. 
Lesson: survival depends on industrious autonomy. The moral in 
the fable is uncompromisingly cruel, but perhaps too ascetic in its 
message. Autonomy need not necessarily be valued for its own sake. 
After all, the natural kingdom is itself replete with innumerable 
parasitic relationships which are viable in their own way. The ques- 
tion to ask is not whether such a symbiosis (read dependence or neo- 
colonialism) is good or bad;13 but whether it is a rational strategy 
(Cohen, 1987: 212). 
‘It has been claimed that small nation states would need to follow 
a development policy which is likely to reduce their present 
economic dependence, that is, one which is likely to make their 
economies somewhat less “open” and promote “internally propelled 
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development”’ (Bacchus, 1989: 15-16). Most microstate policy- 
makers, penetrated as they are with the unassailable force of 
mainstream western logic, continue to chase the elusive phantom of 
viability. Development plans continue to dwell on the advantages 
of local value added, industrialization, the amelioration of the 
national balance of payments. The projected image is often that of 
a ready-to-go enterprise: the microeconomy becomes a state-of-the- 
art turnkey project, waiting only for the kiss of Prince Charming 
(read foreign investment) to launch into a Rostowian take-off. 
However, on bursting the bubble of rhetoric, the chances of a 
microstate developing seem about as likely as those of a frog learn- 
ing to fly (Katzenstein, 1985: 21 1). While microstate economic 
development policy may seem rational and in search of viability, 
microstate politics remains essentially the art of the possible 
(Connell, 1988: 81). The microstate reality is better expressed as an 
insular or enclave territory, for sale or for rent, providing a dignified 
basis for aid reception (Bertram and Watters, 1985; Munro, 1989). 
Income accrues through the provision of services and/or by 
withholding these from undesirable third parties (Ward, 1989: 242). 
The rational development policy facade appears tenable only as a 
sop to actual and potential sponsors and rentiers, who may be led 
to believe that their contribution, even if a pittance by international 
standards, will guide the microstate to some kind of viability. 
Blatant handouts are not so readily justifiable from the donor’s part 
nor desirable from the recipient’s (McKee and Tisdell, 1990: 37). 
And even a few million dollars go a long way on a speck of land 
(‘The Pacific Idea’, The Economist, 16 March 1991). 
Many microstate development plans thus arise from the need 
to demonstrate a serious undertaking by the recipient to utilize 
development loans and investment, actual or potential, offered 
from abroad. It may be a token exercise; nevertheless, it must be 
plausible or it would alienate the all-important transfer of largesse. 
Once successfully obtained, such largesse may not increase but 
rather reduce the ability to produce real income, killing the 
microeconomy through kindness by eroding self-reliance and rein- 
forcing a status of non-viability (Bertram and Watters, 1985: 499; 
Hintjens, 1991: 51; Knapman, 1986: 148). The perceived gains from 
industrialization may also prove largely illusory: the real costs 
incurred may include irreversible ecological and environmental 
implications, difficult to contain on a limited land area, as well as 
the crowding out of cash benefits from the offer of services 
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(Bertram, 1986; Dolman, 1988; Waugh, 1987). Attracting industries 
to microstate settings (with the concomitant distance of markets, 
extra freight and insurance costs, absence of scale economies and 
typically high labour costs) is only possible if such industries are 
heavily subsidized (McKee and Tisdell, 1990: 18; Ramsaran, 
1989: 1, 139). Otherwise, paradoxically, these very same industries 
become respectable structures and operations which disguise aid and 
concessionary finance (Taylor, 1987: 1-3). 
IN DEFENCE OF A MENDICANT STATUS 
If this is the stark contemporary evidence, perhaps an alternative 
proposition could be put forward to understand otherwise patho- 
logical microstate behaviour. It appears that the central economic 
concern for microstates with respect to the outside world is the 
active preservation or, better still, the enhancement of their status 
and desirability as rentier states (Bertram, 1991; Kaplinsky, 
1983: 203-4; Payne, 1991: 18). The pressures and benefits of this 
appear to increase inversely with country size. The only semblance 
of ‘self-reliance’ is the reliance by microstate citizens upon their 
abilities to negotiate the sums of money they need, in return for 
whatever marketable rights they are willing to surrender (Connell, 
1991: 115). In this pursuit of ‘reinforced dependence’ (Lemon, 1987) 
the enhancement of vulnerability and shopping for the fiscal sym- 
pathy it evokes in others is a profitable technique: why else would 
microstates continue to present themselves in international fora in 
this guise (Bray, 1987; Commonwealth Secretariat, 1985; Harden, 
1985)? Similarly, the cultivation and packaging of the myth of 
paradise, of quaintness and of natural exuberance is another 
necessary string to the bow, knowing that this enduring human fan- 
tasy will strike a chord in many alien, western hearts (Cohen, 
1983: 15; Diggines, 1985: 192; Lowenthal, 1972: 13). 
One has only to look at the Diego Garcians and the Marshallese 
(transported away from their island homes when these were sold 
rather than rented in the interests of military strategy) to be 
reminded that sanguine and idealized conclusions need to be 
tempered with caution. Yet, thanks not least to their small size, and 
notwithstanding the obvious differences between various kinds of 
developing microstates, most of them do seem to be seeking the 
same thing: the status of a dignified and enviable mendicant; the 
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achievement of a brittle prosperity without accumulation, without 
restructuring, without ‘development’; eking out an existence as a 
‘pampered periphery’ (Bayliss-Smith et al., 1988: 289). They may be 
fated, or fortunate, in always having been meant to form a part of 
something larger (Naipaul, 1972: 270). 
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1. The one million population mark as the upper threshold for microstate 
qualification has gained wide currency among various international organizations 
and academic studies. See Butter (1985); Commonwealth Secretariat (1985); 
Dolman et al. (1983); Harden (1985); Hein (1989) on behalf of UNCTAD’s 
special programme for the least developed, land-locked and island developing 
countries: UNITAR (1971). The World Bank uses a similar benchmark in the 
statistical appendix of small countries published in its annual World Development 
Report. According to this definition, the world‘s developing microstates are, in 
their vast majority, former British colonies. These are Antigua and Barbuda, 
Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Brunei, Cyprus, Dominica, Fiji, Gambia, Grenada, 
Guyana, Kiribati, Maldives, Malta, Nauru, Seychelles, St Kitts-Nevis, St Lucia, 
St Vincent and the Grenadines, Solomon Islands, Swaziland, Tonga, Tuvalu, 
Vanuatu and Western Samoa. The others include Bahrain, Comoros, Cape 
Verde, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Federated States of Micronesia, Guinea-Bissau, 
Marshall Islands, Qatar, Sao Tom6 and Principe, Surinam, and the United Arab 
Emirates. 
2. The most comprehensive compendium of geographical and political features 
relating to small states and territories remains UNITAR (1971). Perusal of the 
data contained therein must of course take into consideration events (such as declara- 
tions of independence, secessions, annexations, etc.) which have occurred since 
publication. 
3. A number of studies on the effects of country size on various socio-economic 
variables have used population, gross national product, gross domestic product, land 
area, energy consumption and even self-perception as measures of country size. 
These indices have been used either singly or in combination. Examples include 
Downes (1988); Jalan (1982); Kuznets (1960) and Rothstein (1968). 
4. Documented examples of this are found in Payne (1991) and Hoefte and 
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Oostindie (1991) on the British and Dutch Caribbean respectively. Both Malta 
and Mauritius sought integration with Britain prior to the granting of independence 
whereas Cypriots sought enosis with Greece. 
5 .  When the Surinamese Premier Arran asked the Dutch Antillean Prime Minister 
Evartsz why the Antilles would not opt for independence, the reply was crude: ‘If you 
allow yourself to be hanged, it does not mean I will do the same’ (quoted in Hoefte 
and Oostindie, 1991: 75). 
6. Microstates have been described as ‘states without nations’ (Cohen, 1987: 212) 
and ‘states in search of nations still to be formed’ (Beetham, 1984: 209). 
7. This applies to such reactions as Black Power, Ras Tafarianism and the Pacific 
Way; see Lowenthal (1972: 291); Howard (1983). 
8. This observation has been made ad nauseam. A sample of exponents of such 
rampant vulnerability include Benedict (1967: 2), Commonwealth Secretariat (1985); 
Demas (1965: 90-1); Dolman (1985: 41); Doumenge (1985: 96); Harden (1985); Knox 
(1967: 37); Reid (1974: 13); Selwyn (1980: 946). 
9. See, for example, Hope (1983) and the ensuing criticism by Schahczenski 
(1990). 
10. These arguments are adapted from Knox (1967) and Ward (1975), and also 
summarized in Jacome (1992: 236) and Payne (1987: 52-3). Kuznets (1960: 27) 
argued that ‘small countries are under a greater handicap than large in the task of 
economic growth’ - small, at that time, meant a cut-off point of ten million popula- 
tion. The litany of woe is repeated in most subsequent international conferences 
organized on the theme. Possibly Kaminarides (1989: xi-xvi) holds the record for 
describing twenty-nine ‘special constraints’ which beleaguer microstates in the space 
of just two pages of text. 
11. As declared by the Premier of Montserrat in the 1960s and quoted in Thorn- 
dike (1987: 97). 
12. So, for example, the Maldives depend economically on Sri Lanka, itself a 
relatively poor country. The Comoros has so far ‘failed to touch the heart of France’; 
Sao Tomb, as with Cape Verde, has not yet found a more dynamic patron to replace 
not so prosperous Portugal (Harden, 1985: 46). Surinam forfeited substantial Dutch 
aid following the 1980 COUP (Thorndike, 1990) but recovered it after the 1991 elec- 
tions. The Gambia’s putative protector (especially after the political crisis of 1981) 
is equally poor Senegal (Hughes, 1983: 61). 
13. See for example the insightful comparative critique by Hayes (1991) on the 
conflicting stances of social scientists on the issue of emigration and microstate 
dependence in Polynesia. 
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